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EXAMINER
PATEL, NIRAV B

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
2435	

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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

	Application No.	Applicant(s)
Office Action Summary	10/731,299	KARIMISETTY ET AL.
	Examiner	Art Unit	
	NIRAV PATEL	2435	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE *3* MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.
- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

1)☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on *05 December 2008 (Amendment)*.
2a)☒ This action is **FINAL**.   2b)☐ This action is non-final.
3)☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

4)☒ Claim(s) *1-25* is/are pending in the application.
     4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
5)☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
6)☒ Claim(s) *1-25* is/are rejected.
7)☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
8)☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

9)☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
10)☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a)☐ accepted or b)☐ objected to by the Examiner.
     Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
     Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
11)☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

12)☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
     a)☐ All   b)☐ Some * c)☐ None of:
       1.☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
       2.☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
       3.☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
     * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

1)☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
2)☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
3)☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08)
     Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____.

4)☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
     Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ .
5)☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
6)☐ Other: _____ .

DETAILED ACTION

1. Applicant's amendment filed on Dec. 25, 2008 has been entered. Claims 1-25

are pending. Claims 1, 11, 18 and 25 are amended by the applicant.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all

obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

2. Claims 1, 10-12, 18, 19 and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being

unpatentable over Janis et al (US Patent No. 5,128,885) in view of Nishizawa et al. (US

Pub. No. 2001/0039545) in view of Spitz (US Patent No. 7,039,807) and in view of Alley

et al (US Pub. No. 2003/0078880).

As per claim 1, Janis teaches:

receiving information indicative of an occurrence of a predetermined event, the

predetermined event defined to represent a set of operations to be preformed to

accomplish a task; automatically creating an electronic record from data stored in a

plurality of different database tables associated with execution of one or more

operations in the set of operations in response to the occurrence of the predetermined event [Fig. 3, col. 5 lines 15-63, col. 2 lines 30-43, Fig. 2].

Janis teaches storing the records in the database as above. Janis doesn't expressively mention collecting an electronic signature for the record stored in the database.

Nishizawa teaches:

storing an instance of the electronic record in a common repository of electronic records that provides an audit trail that cannot be altered or disabled by users of associated with the database [Fig. 2, paragraph 0100, Fig. 7].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Nishizawa with Janis, since one would have been motivated to manage the electronic documents by which user can easily confirm the original entity of an electronic document [Nishizawa, paragraph 0013].

Nishizawa teaches the electronic record with an electronic signature [paragraph 0127]. Nishizawa doesn't expressively mention a rule associated with the electronic record to determine whether an electronic signature is required.

Spitz teaches executing a rule associated with the electronic record to determine whether an electronic signature is required to connote review and/or approval of the electronic record [col. 3 lines 31-38 col. 6 lines 60-67]; and if execution of the rule results in a determination that an electronic signature is required, initiating a request to collect the required electronic signature [col. 6 lines 15-19].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Spitz with Janis and Nishizawa, since one would have been motivated to disguise the sensitive internal information and avoid an additional burden to the recipient duties [Spitz, col. 3 lines 1-13].

Nishizawa and Spitz do not expressively mention marking the instance of the electronic record as unsigned.

Alley teaches marking the instance of the electronic record as unsigned [Fig. 3, paragraph 0090 lines 16-19].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Alley with Janis, Nishizawa and Spitz, since one would have been motivated to provide a electronic signature and manage the digital documents [Alley, paragraph 0014].

As per claim 10, the rejection of claim 1 is incorporated and Alley teaches the electronic record is initially marked as unsigned by setting an appropriate attribute associated with a database table in which at least part of the record is stored [Fig. 3, 6].

As per claim 11, it encompasses limitations that are similar to those of claim 1. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 1 above.

As per claim 12, the rejection of claim 11 is incorporated and Nishizawa teaches the electronic record is stored in a common repository of electronic records that provides an audit trail that cannot be altered or disabled by users of the database [Fig. 2, paragraph 0131, 0132].

As per claim 18, it encompasses limitations that are similar to those of claim 1. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 1 above.

As per claim 19, the rejection of claim 18 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 3. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 3 above.

As per claim 25, Janis teaches:

receiving information indicative of an occurrence of a predetermined event associated with an industrial process, each event in the one or more events indicative of a set of operations to be preformed to accomplish a task in the industrial process; storing data in the database in a plurality of different database tables in response to execution of one or more operations associated with the one or more events, in the data related to the execution of the one or more operations; generating an electronic record in response to the occurrence of the predetermined event in the one or more events from at least a portion of the data stored in the plurality of different database tables [Fig. 3, col. 5 lines 15-63, col. 2 lines 30-43, Figs. 1, 2].

Nishizawa teaches:

storing an instance of the electronic record in a common repository of electronic records as a well-formed XML document that tracks the predetermined event in a common repository of electronic records that provides an audit trail that cannot be altered or disabled by users of associated with the database [Fig. 2, paragraph 0100, Fig. 5-8].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Nishizawa with Janis, since one would have been motivated to manage the electronic documents by which user can easily confirm the original entity of an electronic document [Nishizawa, paragraph 0013].

Nishizawa teaches the electronic record with an electronic signature [paragraph 0127]. Nishizawa doesn't expressively mention a rule associated with the electronic record to determine whether an electronic signature is required.

Spitz teaches executing a rule associated with the electronic record to determine whether an electronic signature is required to connote review and/or approval of the electronic record [col. 3 lines 31-38 col. 6 lines 60-67]; and if execution of the rule results in a determination that an electronic signature is required, initiating a request to collect the required electronic signature [col. 6 lines 15-19].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Spitz with Janis and Nishizawa, since one would have been motivated to disguise the sensitive internal information and avoid an additional burden to the recipient duties [Spitz, col. 3 lines 1-13].

Nishizawa and Spitz do not expressively mention marking the instance of the electronic

record as unsigned.

Alley teaches marking the instance of the electronic record as unsigned [Fig. 3,

paragraph 0090 lines 16-19].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time

the invention was made to combine Alley with Janis, Nishizawa and Spitz, since one

would have been motivated to provide a electronic signature and manage the digital

documents [Alley, paragraph 0014].

3.   Claims 2, 3, 7, 16, 17, 23 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being

unpatentable over Janis et al (US Patent No. 5,128,885) in view of Nishizawa et al. (US

Pub. No. 2001/0039545) in view of Spitz (US Patent No. 7,039,807) in view of Alley et al

(US Pub. No. 2003/0078880) and in view of in view of Hawkins et al (US Patent No.

7,146,500).

As per claim 2, the rejection of claim 1 is incorporated and Alley teaches receiving an

electronic signature from the user and marking the instance of the electronic record as

signed [Fig. 3, 0090].

Alley doesn't expressively mention verifying the electronic signature.

Hawakins teaches receiving an electronic signature from the user; verifying the electronic signature and in response to a positive verification of the electronic signature, adding the signature [Fig. 3, col. 5 lines 50-65].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Hawakins with Janis, Nishizawa and Spitz and Alley, since one would have been motivated to provide secure environment and safe storage for storing the electronic record [Hawakins, col. 1 line 8-9].

As per claim 3, the rejection of claim 2 is incorporated and Nishizawa teaches the electronic record is stored in a common repository of electronic records that provides an audit trail that cannot be altered or disabled by users of the database [Fig. 2, paragraph 0131, 0132].

As per claim 7, the rejection of claim 1 is incorporated and Spitz teaches execution of the rules results in a determination that an electronic signature is required [col. 6 lines 60-67].

Hawakins teaches:

if an electronic signature is required, displaying data from the electronic record on a computer display [col. 7 lines 21-34].

As per claim 16, the rejection of claim 11 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 2. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 2 above.

As per claim 17, the rejection of claim 16 is incorporated and Alley teaches the electronic record is initially marked as unsigned by setting an appropriate attribute associated with a database table in which at least part of the record is stored [Fig. 3, 6].

As per claim 23, the rejection of claim 18 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 2. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 2 above.

As per claim 24, the rejection of claim 23 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 17. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 17 above.

4. Claims 4-6, 13-15 and 20-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Janis et al (US Patent No. 5,128,885) in view of Nishizawa et al. (US Pub. No. 2001/0039545) in view of Spitz (US Patent No. 7,039,807) in view of Alley et al (US Pub. No. 2003/0078880) and in view of in view of Chang et al (US Patent No. 6,584,459).

As per claim 4, the rejection of claim 1 is incorporated and Nishizawa teaches the electronic record comprises unstructured data [paragraph 0016, 0017].

Nishizawa doesn't expressively mention a character large object (CLOB) format.

Chang teaches unstructured data in a character large object (CLOB) format [Fig. 3].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Chang with Janis, Nishizawa and Spitz and Alley, since one would have been motivated to manage and store the digital documents [Alley, paragraph 0014].

As per claim 5, the rejection of claim 3 is incorporated and Chang teaches the unstructured data comprises a well-formed XML document stored within a column of a table stored in the database [Fig. 3].

As per claim 6, the rejection of claim 4 is incorporated and Nishizawa teaches:

fields of the electronic record are filled with XML data based on a predefined mapping to multiple data sources [paragraph 0117, 0118, Fig. 4, 9].

As per claim 13, the rejection of claim 12 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 4. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 4 above.

As per claim 14, the rejection of claim 13 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 5. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 5 above.

As per claim 15, the rejection of claim 14 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 6. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 6 above.

As per claim 20, the rejection of claim 19 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 4. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 4 above.

As per claim 21, the rejection of claim 20 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 5. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 5 above.

As per claim 22, the rejection of claim 21 is incorporated and it encompasses limitations that are similar to limitations of claim 6. Thus, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against claim 6 above.

5. Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Janis et al (US Patent No. 5,128,885) in view of Nishizawa et al. (US Pub. No. 2001/0039545) in view of Spitz (US Patent No. 7,039,807) in view of Alley et al (US Pub. No. 2003/0078880) and in view of in view of Hawkins et al (US Patent No. 7,146,500) and in view of Kato et la (US Pub. 2002/0040431).

As per claim 8, the rejection of claim 7 is incorporated and Nishizawa teaches the electronic record comprises the XML document [Fig. 9].

Kato teaches data from the electronic record is display according to a predefined layout set forth in an XSL style sheet [paragraph 0077].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine Kato with Janis, Nishizawa, Spitz, Alley and Hawkins, since one would have been motivated to provide secure environment and safe storage for storing the electronic record [Hawakins, col. 1 line 8-9].

6. Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Janis et al (US Patent No. 5,128,885) in view of Nishizawa et al. (US Pub. No. 2001/0039545) in

view of Spitz (US Patent No. 7,039,807) in view of Alley et al (US Pub. No.

2003/0078880) and in view of in view of Hopkins et al (US Patent No. 7,093,133).

As per claim 9, the rejection of claim 1 is incorporated and Hopkins teaches:

the rule requires a plurality of different electronic signatures and wherein, if execution of

the rule results in a determination that a plurality of electronic signatures are required,

requesting the plurality of electronic signatures [col. 2 lines 30-38].

Therefore, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time

the invention was made to combine Hopkins with Janis, Nishizawa and Spitz and Alley,

since one would have been motivated to provide a reliable and secure means of

authenticating digital messages/records [Hopkins, col. 2 lines 22-23].

Double Patenting

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).
    A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement.
    Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

7. Claims 1-25 provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-26 of copending application No. 10/731655 and further in view of claims 1-22 of copending application no. 10/731657. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from the each other because Claims 1-25 of the instant application is obvious over claims 1-26 of copending Application No. 10/731655 and further in view of claims 1-22 of copending application no. 10/731657 as pending applications use a rule associated with the record to determine whether an electronic signature is required and generate electronic signature for securely storing and accessing electronic records.

Response to Amendment

8. Applicant has amended claims 1, 11, 18, 25, which necessitated new ground of rejection. See new ground of rejection above.

Due to failure in submitting the terminal disclaimer for the provisional double patenting rejection, Examiner maintains the Double patenting rejection.

Conclusion

9. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP

§ 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37
CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE
MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within
TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not
mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the
shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any
extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of
the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later
than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications
from the examiner should be directed to Nirav Patel whose telephone number is 571-
272-5936. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the
examiner's supervisor, Kim Vu can be reached on 571-272-3859. The fax and phone
numbers for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-
273-8300. Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or
proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is 571-272-
2100.

/N. P./
Examiner, Art Unit 2435
/Kimyen Vu/
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2435